'Tears such as angels weep': The Evolution of Sadness in Demons

Juanita Feros Ruys

> [...] now conscience wakes despair
> That slumbered [...]
> Sometimes towards Eden which now in his view
> Lay pleasant, his grieved look he fixes sad [...]
> Then, much revolving, thus in sighs began [...]
> 'Me miserable! Which way shall I fly
> Infinite wrath and infinite despair? [...]
> For never can true reconcilement grow
> Where wounds of deadly hate have pierced so deep [...]
> So farewell hope, and, with hope farewell fear,
> Farewell remorse'
>
> (*Paradise Lost*, IV, 23–28, 73–74, 98–99, 108–09)[1]

These lines by John Milton, especially when accompanied by the evocative nineteenth-century engravings of Gustave Doré, present a Satan riven by powerful emotions. In just a few lines Milton has evoked diabolic sadness, grief, despair, hatred, fear, hope, and remorse. Yet the Christian tradition from the New Testament and patristic eras into the High Middle Ages did not, on the whole, credit the Devil and demons with this level of emotional

[1] John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, ed. by Fowler, pp. 216–21.

Juanita Feros Ruys (juanita.ruys@sydney.edu.au) is Director of the Sydney Node of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions, and Senior Research Fellow and Associate Director of the Medieval and Early Modern Centre at The University of Sydney.

Understanding Emotions in Early Europe, ed. by Michael Champion and Andrew Lynch, EER 8 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), 51–71 BREPOLS PUBLISHERS 10.1484/M.EER-EB.5.105222

complexity.[2] Although there are some exceptions in the vernacular, and particularly the Old English poems of the Junius manuscript,[3] until the High Middle Ages, the dominant Latinate tradition depicted fallen angels as acting according to the directives they received (whether from God or the Devil), and not as animated by personal passions or as possessed of interior individual motivations.

As the emotional capacity attributed to demons developed during the Middle Ages, texts such as the miracle tales of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries began to depict in demons a limited range of emotional expressions, as for instance, malicious glee or rage. Demons might erupt in cacophonous laughter whenever a sin was committed or an unrepentant sinner consigned to them for eternal torture, or they might react with fury when a wayward soul was snatched from their clutches by deathbed confession and repentance or a saint's intercession. In the fifteenth century, Jean Gerson characterized demons in his treatise on the passions as blinded by insane spite, unregulated and savage pride, and senseless envy;[4] meanwhile the emerging genre of the *ars moriendi* (Art of Dying) manual was frequently accompanied by prints portraying demons filled with irascible emotions as their deathbed temptations were foiled by saints and guardian angels.[5]

What is different with regard to Milton's portrayal of Satan, and which forms the subject of this chapter, is the attribution to him, and to demons in general, of the associated emotions of sadness, sorrow, grief, and despair. This chapter aims to explore the evolution of sadness in demons from the High Middle Ages, considering key factors that impacted upon this trajectory. Primary among these was the recognition by medieval writers of the theological hazards that could ensue if demons were pictured as capable of sadness and so turned into objects worthy of empathy. The emotion of sadness (*tristitia*) was powerfully aligned throughout the Middle Ages with the nature of humanity and consequently the divine humanity of Jesus. Indeed, the ability of Jesus to feel sadness was considered one of the key features that defined him as more than impassible God simply clothed in human form. Assigning sad-

[2] See my 'Sensitive Spirits'. Neil Forsyth writes of Milton's Satan: 'Whatever he owes to medieval predecessors, then, this interior and troubled dimension of Satan makes him a product of the early modern world'; Forsyth, *The Satanic Epic*, p. 56

[3] See, for example, the figure of Satan in *Genesis B* and *Christ and Satan*: see Krapp, *The Junius Manuscript*, and Finnegan, *Christ and Satan*. See also Dendle, *Satan Unbound*.

[4] Jean Gerson, *De passionibus animae*, 15, in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. by Glorieux, IX, 423: 'excoecat enim eos malitia amens, superbia furens sine lege et ordine, livor insaniens.'

[5] See Hind, *An Introduction to a History of Woodcut*, I, 224–30.

ness to demons would mean drawing such creatures closer to the fundamental nature of both humanity and Jesus himself. Moreover, as Milton's verses cited above recognize, greater danger lay in the fact that sadness was frequently seen as the trigger for remorse and repentance. Since it was a tenet of orthodoxy that demons and the Devil could neither repent nor be absolved of their original apostasy, attributing sadness to demons could have the hazardous effect of creating sentimentalized demons capable of arousing empathy, in place of the hateful and implacable adversaries entirely divorced from all goodness upon which Christian theology insisted.

Demons and Sorrow: 'Dolor' and 'Tristitia'

On the whole, demons were not supposed to have the capacity to experience passions of the soul (*passiones animae*) such as sadness. This viewpoint was most influentially stated by Thomas Aquinas in what is sometimes called his 'Treatise on the Passions', *Quaestiones* 22–48 of the First Part of the Second Part (IaIIae) of his *Summa theologiae*.[6] Here Aquinas defined a passion of the soul as a movement of the sensitive appetite of the soul allied with some bodily change. This meant that incorporeal beings — God, angels, and demons — could not, by definition, experience a passion of the soul. Instead, Aquinas argued, the sorts of 'passions' attributed to such beings, as for example the love and joy ascribed to God and the angels in the Scriptures, were not passions proper, but rather simple acts of the will, residing in the intellective, not the sensitive, appetite.[7]

Aquinas treats the passion of sorrow under the doubled terms *dolor et tristitia* in IaIIae, Q. 35–39, in twenty-five distinct articles, which renders it the most extensively examined of the passions.[8] In Q. 35, art. 2, Aquinas distin-

[6] For an introduction to and summary of Aquinas's thought on the passions, see King, 'Aquinas on the Passions'; and Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*.

[7] See for example Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, Q. 22, a. 3, ad 3: 'Ad tertium dicendum quod amor et gaudium et alia huiusmodi, cum attribuuntur Deo vel Angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectivum, significant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus, absque passione'; see also I, Q. 59. All citations from the works of Aquinas are from <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html> [accessed 10 September 2014].

[8] Miner notes: 'Of all the passions, sorrow or sadness (*tristitia*) is "most properly" said to be a passion. Perhaps because the soul is most violently acted upon (*pati*) when it suffers, the phenomena denoted by "sorrow" and "suffering" overlap considerably. The close connection between *pati* and sorrowing/suffering may explain why Aquinas devotes more Questions to

guishes between *dolor* (pain/suffering) and *tristitia* (sadness), categorizing *tristitia* as a species of *dolor*, where *dolor* arises through the exterior senses before being apprehended by the interior sense, while *tristitia* arises through the interior senses.[9] Earlier in the *Summa*, Aquinas had argued that sorrow (*dolor*) could not be experienced by demons as a passion, since they did not have bodies, but could be felt as a simple act of will, insofar as their will either for or against something was frustrated. He particularly noted that for their punishment to be effective, it had to be contrary to their will, and hence a source of intellective, though not sensitive, *dolor* to them.[10]

However, there had long been theological objections to the idea that demons could not suffer *sensible* grief and torment. A corrective position, dating from Plotinus and Augustine and reiterated in the High Middle Ages by thinkers such as Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard, argued that following their fall, the demons had been deprived of their original angelic empyrean bodies and been cast down instead into denser airy (*caliginosus*, or cloudy) bodies that were susceptible to pain and suffering from the only element that was superior to them: fire.[11] Scholastic debate raged over whether this would need to be a genuine fire (as in the fires of Hell), or whether simply the thought of fire (that is, the apprehension of future punishment) would be sufficient, just as a dreamer experiencing a nightmare perceives the imaginary to be real and suffers accordingly.

tristitia than to any other passion. Another explanation of the treatment's comparative length would recall the complexity of the historical conversation'; Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, pp. 188–89.

[9] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, Q. 35, a. 2, co: 'ille dolor qui ex exteriori apprehensione causatur, nominatur quidem dolor, non autem tristitia. Sic igitur tristitia est quaedam species doloris'; see also IaIIae, Q. 37, a. 7, co: 'Dolor etiam exterior sequitur apprehensionem sensus, et specialiter tactus, dolor autem interior sequitur apprehensionem interiorem, imaginationis scilicet vel etiam rationis.'

[10] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, Q. 64, a. 3, co: 'Respondeo dicendum quod timor, dolor, gaudium, et huiusmodi, secundum quod sunt passiones, in Daemonibus esse non possunt, sic enim sunt propriae appetitus sensitivi, qui est virtus in organo corporali. Sed secundum quod nominant simplices actus voluntatis, sic possunt esse in Daemonibus. Et necesse est dicere quod in eis sit dolor. [...] Unde oportet dicere quod in eis sit dolor, et praecipue quia de ratione poenae est, quod voluntati repugnet.'

[11] See for instance Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, III. 10, trans. by Hill, p. 225; Peter Lombard, *The Sentences*, Book II: *On Creation*, D. VIII, C. 1, trans. by Silano, II, 34.

Demons as Productive of Sadness in Humans

Although it was not always clear whether demons could suffer sadness themselves, they were certainly attributed with the creation of sadness in humans. In Cassian's Conference Seven, Abba Serenus relates that particular demons are embodiments of individual vicious emotions that they instil or incite in humans, so that some 'are more especially intent on anger and rage. Others, again, feed on sadness ('alios pasci tristitia'), and still others are pleased with vainglory and pride'.[12] Interestingly, however, he intimates that demons do not experience these particular emotions themselves: their universal response to the emotional pain they inflict is delight: 'Each one insinuates that vice into human hearts in which he himself rejoices' ('gaudet').[13] A similar sense is given in a vision related by the eleventh-century monk Otloh of St Emmeram. Finding himself, in a dream, surrounded by demons laughing maliciously at their evils, Otloh grows increasingly sad ('tristiorem'). The demons take exception to this emotional response and advise Otloh that if he elects not join them in their joy ('nobiscum gaudere et ioculari non vis'), then they will see to it that he experiences sadness instead to its limits.[14] This story eloquently expresses the high medieval understanding of how demons operate to produce sadness in humans, and yet how remote that emotion is considered to be from the demonic constitution itself.

In early desert monasticism, demons were particularly associated with the sin of *acedia* (sloth), which was a specific permutation of sadness, also known after Psalm 90. 6 (91. 6) as 'the noonday demon'.[15] Many centuries later, Caesarius of Heisterbach was still warning monks of the snares of the Devil that lay in sloth, relating the story of a somnolent brother seen asleep in his stall, the Devil as a serpent slithering over his back and feasting on his sleepiness.[16]

[12] John Cassian, *Conferences*, trans. by Ramsey, p. 259; ed. by Pichery, p. 260: 'Hoc tamen nosse debemus [...] alios irae furorique peculiarius inminere, alios pasci tristitia, alios cenedoxia superbiaque mulceri.'

[13] John Cassian, *Conferences*, trans. by Ramsey, p. 259; ed. by Pichery, p. 260: '[...] et unumquemque illud uitium humanis cordibus quo ipse gaudet inserere.'

[14] Otloh von St. Emmeram, *Liber visionum*, ed. by Schmidt, p. 56, line 27; p. 57, line 6; 'Quia ergo elegisti tristiciam, satis profecto experieris illam.'

[15] See John Cassian, *Institutes*, X. 1, trans. by Ramsey, p. 219; ed. by Petschenig, p. 174: 'Sextum nobis certamen est, quod Graeci *ἀκηδίαν* uocant, quam nos taedium siue anxietatem cordis possumus nuncupare. [...] denique nonnulli senum hunc esse pronuntiant meridianum daemonem, qui in psalmo nonagensimo nuncupatur.' See also Wenzel, *The Sin of Sloth*, pp. 7–8.

[16] Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum*, D. IV, C. XXXII, ed. by Strange, I, 203: 'Die quadam tempore aestivo, cum laudes decanterentur, vidi in dorso fratris Wilhelmi, qui

It is interesting that this image of diabolic forces 'feeding off' (*pasci*, *pascebatur*) varieties of sadness should remain a potent metaphor across the several centuries between Cassian and Caesarius. Again, however, demons themselves were seen as immune from experiencing this form of sadness. Aquinas considered the question explicitly in his *Summa*, declaring that the incorporeality of demons prohibited them from suffering *acedia* because the condition necessarily included bodily weariness: 'Sloth is a certain kind of sadness, by which a man turns only reluctantly to his spiritual exercises on account of bodily fatigue; this is not applicable to demons.'[17]

Demons as Sufferers of Sorrow

There are only a few brief instances in the Latin tradition where demons are shown experiencing sadness in Christian thought prior to the early modern era, and in most cases this sadness is more a variety of frustration. That is, it is a reaction against the actions of others and allied with the emotion of anger, rather than inherent, that is, springing from an internal disposition.

An early example occurs in Cassian's Conference Seven on Evil Spirits.[18] In relating the spiritual combat between the desert monks of early Christianity and their ever-present demonic tempters, Cassian's speaker, Abba Serenus, notes that this is a true battle, containing winners and losers, with both sides experiencing the highs of success and the lows of defeat. Thus, he says, the demons do not 'engage in this struggle without any effort of their own. For they themselves also have a certain anxiety and sadness ('anxietatem et tristitiam') in the conflict, especially when they meet with stronger rivals'. Accordingly, they will suffer 'grief and distress' ('dolor atque confusio') if defeated.[19] Here Cassian's rhetoric

libenter ibi dormit, clara die serpentem serpere, et statim intellexi quia diabolus esset, qui in eius somnolentia pascebatur.'

[17] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, Q. 63, a. 2, ad 2: 'Acedia vero est quaedam tristitia, qua homo redditur tardus ad spirituales actus propter corporalem laborem; qui Daemonibus non competit.' Translations are my own unless otherwise stated.

[18] This instance is discussed by Rosenwein in *Emotional Communities*, pp. 182–85. While Rosenwein notes that demons are associated above all with pride and envy, she does not appear to recognize that the attribution of sadness to demons is extremely rare in the medieval period: 'Envy, anger, grief, fear: Ekman and Friesen's modern list of "universal emotions" differs little from the Devil's emotional capacity in the late seventh century' (p. 185).

[19] John Cassian, *Conferences*, trans. by Ramsey, p. 260; ed. by Pichery, p. 262: 'Habent namque etiam ipsi in suo conflictu quandam anxietatem atque tristitiam et maxime cum fuerint ualidioribus aemulis'; 'super deiectione maneat dolor atque confusio'.

is designed to affirm the real nature of the struggle that monks would undergo, preparing them for steadfastness against temptation and giving them the sense of an opponent worthy of being overcome, in whose downfall and subsequent confusion they can rejoice. Yet the result is an emotion attributed to beings who are usually, and especially at this early period, represented as indifferent to the outcome of their machinations. When Cassian has Abba Serenus conclude that in defeat, the demons 'grieve ('dolent') no less than we',[20] he draws demons into closer contiguity with human nature through their expression and experience of the emotion of sadness. Nevertheless, this is patently a reactive sadness, motivated by the demons' unsuccessful combat and not something essential in their own nature. It is thus explicable in terms of Aquinas's understanding of any demonic 'emotions' as fundamentally volitional — that is, as springing from either the achievement or frustration (as here) of their will.

In the scholasticism of the High Middle Ages, the question of demonic emotions became the subject of more systematic speculation, although sadness remained one of the least considered of the passions in this regard, with demonic anger, hatred, envy, and lust remaining the focus. William of Auvergne treats demonic sadness briefly in his *De universo*, Pt. II, Pt. III, C. IIII, where he finds it a necessary counterpoint to demonic joy, which constitutes his primary study, arguing that since it is clear that demons are saddened at the good that befalls humans, so it is necessary that they delight in their evils.[21] He posits an irremediable cause for sorrow in demons, suggesting that although the evils committed by humans, in which demons rejoice, might outnumber good works done by humans, nevertheless the *magnitude* of the good works done, which cause demons sorrow, will always exceed that of the evils committed.[22] This will leave demons in an emotional deficit of sadness that cannot be mitigated, no matter how many evils are committed or how long the world should endure.[23] Taking this analogy further, William adds that demons sorrow over

[20] John Cassian, *Conferences*, trans. by Ramsey, p. 261; ed. by Pichery, p. 263: 'Dolent igitur etiam ipsi non minus.'

[21] William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, I, 1021bA: 'Cùm manifestum sit, eos dolere de bonis ipsorum, necesse est gaudere de malis eorundem.'

[22] William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, I, 1021bC: 'quapropter magnitudo, & intentio bonorum paucitatem eorum non solum redimunt, & compensant magnitudinem, & multitudinem malorum, sed etiam illam incomparabiliter superant, & excedunt.'

[23] William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, I, 1021bC: 'Quare non est necesse ut gaudium quod est malignis spiritibus de malis hominum, aut de malis aliis, absorbeat dolores, & cruciatus eorum, nec etiam, ut mitiget, aut temperet illos, licet mundus in isto cursu duraturus esset in infinitum.'

the immensity of the glory of the Creator with a grief that is incomparably greater than every joy they could ever take in the evils of humans.[24] This is more than the sadness of a frustrated will; this is an evocation of true internal sadness. Yet William does not allow these demons to remain fundamentally sorrowful figures, which might constitute them as worthy of compassion. Instead, the overwhelming impression of William's demons is of beings who are implacable in their wrath and hatred for humans, the good angels, and God, and divided amongst themselves by currents of pride, envy, and anger 'just like a kind of spiritual tempest'.[25]

Even more explicitly, the Franciscan theologian Peter John Olivi depicts demons as beset, and indeed, impelled by seething tides of emotions. Yet the situation is not unambiguous, for while Olivi does not seem to depict in demons a simple sadness that might render them objects of pity, he does ascribe to them a passion far more powerful and loaded with theological implications. Although Olivi notes that the evil joy demons take in their temptations of humans is not uninterrupted, he does not posit sadness as its opposite. Instead, he pictures the delight of demons as soured by the 'bitter and corrosive dregs of tumultuous wrath, envy, an insatiable and raging lust that is always infinitely more hungering than fulfilled, and the unavoidable apprehension of future punishment'.[26] Olivi does not attribute sadness to demons as a sole and discrete emotion; it only appears allied with more 'typically' demonic emotions such as wrath. Thus when he pictures the emotions that demons might feel when frustrated in their intentions — for instance, when they are thrust into Hell, prohibited from tempting someone, overcome by holy men, or mocked by God and the good angels — he describes them as being both 'saddened and enraged' ('contristantur et irascuntur').[27] Olivi suggests that while demons' awareness

[24] William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, I, 1021bD: 'Nec prætermittendum est tibi quantùm doleant de immensitate gloriæ creatoris, de qua si dolent similitudinem, & comparationem, qualis excogitari posset aliorum bonorum, dolent indubitanter dolore omni gaudio, quod habere possunt de malis hominum, incomparabiliter majori.'

[25] William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, I, 1044aH: 'Deinde cùm ira, velut tempestas quædam spiritualis sit, qualiter inter extremæ iracundiæ substantias pax esse poterit [...]?'

[26] Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, Q. XLVI, ed. by Jansen, I, 748: 'Sciendum tamen quod huiusmodi complacentia non est mera, sed amaris et corrosivis faecibus turbulentae irae et invidiae et insatiabilis et furiosae concupiscentiae semper plus in infinitum famelicae quam satiatae, faecibus etiam indubitabilis expectationis omnimodae suae poenae semper est commixta.'

[27] Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, Q. XLVI, ed. by Jansen,

of their imminent destruction at the Final Judgement does not prevent them from undertaking evil activities, it does cause them to carry these out with less delight and greater sadness ('indelectabilius et tristius').[28]

Yet despite the rather medieval focus here on demonic wrath and delight in evil deeds, some hints do also emerge of the sort of sorrowing emotions that will render Milton's early modern Satan so memorable. Thus Olivi speaks of the demons' awareness of their forthcoming punishment as a 'despair of God and a despairing remoteness from both him and all his good'.[29] Later he depicts the demons as being at the mercy of their emotions, urged on to evil deeds by their overwhelming despair at their imminent punishment.[30] For his time, Olivi's insistent attribution of despair ('desperatio ... desperativa ... desperat ... desperatum') to demons is unprecedented. So also is the (perhaps unintended) pathos of his depiction of the demons as perennially acted upon by their emotions, now raising themselves to heaven engorged with proud delight and audacity, now falling into the abyss through pining and a desperate loss of hope.[31] Olivi concludes that demons constantly stagger between the two extremes, just like drunks ('continue sicut ebrii perturbantur'). The specific comparison here to alcoholics recalls the language employed by Ambrose in his *De bono mortis* where he speaks of the human soul, at the mercy of its embodied passions, as 'staggering and swaying just like a drunk'.[32] As such, Olivi's language bears

I, 748: 'Unde quando ad horam in infernum detruduntur aut a tentando cohibentur aut a sanctis viriliter et triumphaliter expugnantur aut a Deo et eius sanctis angelis multiformiter deluduntur: utique amplius contristantur et irascuntur.'

[28] Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, Q. XLVI, ed. by Jansen, I, 749: 'Timore vero poenae ab eorum sensuali aspectu absentis, qualis est novissimi iudicii poena, non retrahuntur a malo, nisi solum pro quanto ex eius expectatione indelectabilius et tristius perficiunt mala sua.'

[29] Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, Q. XLVI, ed. by Jansen, I, 748: 'est ibi desperatio de Deo et desperativa elongatio ab ipso et ab omni eius bono.'

[30] Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, Q. XLVI, ed. by Jansen, I, 750: 'poena quae sic sibi imminet quod omnino desperat se eam evasurum potius generat in eo desperatum ad omnia mala praecipitium quam timorem retractivum.'

[31] Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, Q. XLVI, ed. by Jansen, I, 748: 'nunc per superbam complacentiam et praesumptuosam audaciam seu confidentiam ascendunt usque ad caelos, ac deinde per contabescentiam et desperatam diffidentiam praevalendi descendunt usque ad abyssos.'

[32] Ambrose, *De bono mortis*, IX, ed. by Schenkl, p. 737: 'et tamquam ebria perturbationibus eius uacillet et fluitet'.

witness to the movement towards anthropomorphizing demons and their passional states by the end of the thirteenth century.

The Impassibility of God and the Angels

The major consideration that influenced whether, and how, demons could be depicted as emotional beings, and particularly ones subject to sadness, was the understanding of the emotional systems applicable to other key beings in the universe: God, the good angels, and the god-man Christ. Since God and the good angels were conceived throughout the Middle Ages as impassible, having demons that could feel immediately removed them one step further from the celestial hierarchy that oversaw the medieval world. As a perfect, immutable, and incorporeal being, God was unable to be moved towards anything that approached a human affection, including joy and compassion.[33] Theologians struggled with a way to synthesize this idea with the concept of a loving God who cared for his Creation, and in his *Proslogion*, Anselm of Canterbury elegantly articulated the doubled reasoning that was required to hold these two thoughts in equilibrium:

> For when you look upon us in our misery it is we who feel the effect of your mercy, but you do not experience the feeling. Therefore you are both merciful because you save the sorrowful and pardon sinners against you; and you are not merciful because you do not experience any feeling of compassion for misery.[34]

Moreover, Aquinas argued that the emotion of sadness (sorrow, grief) had to be doubly denied to God, both because God was insensible to passions in general, but also because even if God could feel passions, as a perfect being he could

[33] Early Church Fathers (Origen, Tertullian, and Lactantius in his *De ira Dei*) had considered the passibility of God, but from the time of Augustine, God's impassibility was a doctrine of the Church: see Lieb, 'Reading God', esp. pp. 215–17; and Weinandy, *Does God Suffer?*, esp. ch. 4: 'Bridges to the Patristic Doctrine of God' and ch. 5: 'The Patristic Doctrine of God'.

[34] Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, VIII, trans. by Charlesworth, p. 91; ed. by Schmitt, I, 106: 'Etenim cum tu respicis nos miseros, nos sentimus misericordis effectum; tu non sentis affectum. Et misericors es igitur, quia miseros salvas, et peccatoribus tuis parcis; et misericors non es, quia nulla miseriae compassione afficeris.' Augustine had formulated a similar set of impossible equivalencies to describe God's emotions in the opening chapter of his *De patientia*: 'sicut autem zelat sine aliquo liuore, irascitur sine aliqua perturbatione, miseretur sine aliquo dolore, paenitet eum sine alicuius suae prauitatis correctione: ita est patiens sine ulla passione': Augustine, *De patientia*, ed. by Zycha, I. 1, 663.

never feel 'bad' ones that indicated some kind of lack in him. Aquinas theorized this as the denial to God of passions not only by reason of their genus (as passions) but also by reason of their species.[35] Such a species of passion, he declared, was sorrow or pain (*tristitia vel dolor*), since it arose from an evil already present; as a result, neither sadness nor sorrow could ever be found in God.[36]

Meanwhile, medieval angelology was producing similar theories of impassibility in relation to the good angels who had not rebelled against God and had subsequently been confirmed in grace. Aquinas noted that the good angels were no more capable of grieving or of compassion towards humans than God was.[37] Because sorrow and grief arise only from the obstruction of the will, and angels have a will perfectly aligned with that of God, they cannot suffer.[38] Bonaventure contended that since there was no grief or sadness outside of punishment, and the good angels had no faults for which they could be punished, consequently they must be free from grief and sadness.[39] As David Keck observes, medieval angels 'are Christianized Stoics'.[40]

Moreover, Aquinas pointed out, any references in the Scriptures to angels feeling negative emotions — as for example Isaiah 33. 7: 'the angels of peace

[35] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk I, C. 89, n. 8: 'Quaedam autem passiones removentur a Deo non solum ratione sui generis, sed etiam ratione specie.' See also Kretzmann, 'Aquinas on God's Joy, Love, and Liberality', pp. 125–48.

[36] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk I, C. 89, n. 8: 'Talis autem est tristitia vel dolor: nam eius obiectum est malum iam inhaerens [...] Tristitia igitur et dolor ex ipsa sui ratione in Deo esse non possunt.' See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, Q. 21, a. 3, co: 'Tristari ergo de miseria alterius non competit Deo.'

[37] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis*, Bk 2, D. 11, Q. 1, a. 5, co: 'ideo nihil potest accidere de quo doleant Angeli, sicut nec de quo doleat Deus'; Bk 2, D. 11, Q. 1, a. 5, ad 2: 'compati non potest qui passibilis non est; et ideo ex impassibilitate Angelorum hoc accidit quod condolere non possunt.'

[38] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, Q. 113, a. 7, co: 'Tristitia enim et dolor, secundum Augustinum, non est nisi de his quae contrariantur voluntati. Nihil autem accidit in mundo quod sit contrarium voluntati Angelorum et aliorum beatorum, quia voluntas eorum totaliter inhaeret ordini divinae iustitiae.'

[39] Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, Bk 2, D. XI, a. 2, q. 3, sc. 3: 'dolor et tristitia non est sine poena, et poena non est sine culpa praevia; sed in beatis Angelis nunquam fuit culpa: ergo nec fuit nec potest esse tristitia'; all citations from this text are from <http://www.franciscan-archive.org/bonaventura/sent.html> [accessed 10 September 2014].

[40] Keck, *Angels & Angelology in the Middle Ages*, p. 108: 'Seneca's description of the intellectual and emotional qualities of the happy person or the philosopher could also be Bonaventure's description of an angel.'

will weep bitterly' ('angeli pacis amare flebunt') — had to be taken metaphorically.[41] Bonaventure suggested an exegesis of this verse either in terms of the 'angels' standing for the good officers of the Church or in terms of 'weeping' offering a deliberately anthropomorphized representation of an angel's inner state.[42] Therefore the 'Tears such as angels weep' which spring from Milton's Satan as he surveys his fallen comrades and followers in *Paradise Lost* (Bk I, line 620, p. 98), and which provide the title to this paper, mark a distinction between a somatically emotional early modern prince of demons and the impassive angels of medieval theology.

Man of Sorrows: The Passibility of Christ's Human Soul

In this same period, the question of whether the human nature of Jesus was capable of truly suffering passions of the soul was under serious consideration. Theologians were not just concerned with whether the fleshly body adopted by Jesus at his incarnation exhibited natural external bodily reactions to stimuli such as hunger, thirst, and tiredness, but whether his divine soul internally apprehended and experienced passions — and particularly 'bad' passions such as sorrow, fear, and anger — that could only be designated as inherently human (that is, not capable of being experienced by a divine being).

The Bible itself was an important source, with both Old and New Testaments providing texts that could depict a sorrowing Jesus. The description in Isaiah of the suffering servant, which was read in the Christian era as referring prophetically to Jesus, spoke of him as a 'man of sorrows' (Isaiah 53. 3: 'virum dolorum') and related that 'he bore our sufferings' (Isaiah 53. 4: 'dolores nostros ipse portavit'). Jesus as the 'man of sorrows' became a powerful focus for individual piety, especially in the later Middle Ages.[43] More particularly, the representa-

[41] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis*, Bk 2, D. 11, Q. 1, a. 5, ad 1: 'Si autem ad Angelos referatur, intelligendus est dolor non proprie, sed metaphorice, per modum quo etiam frequenter in Scripturis Deo attribuitur.'

[42] Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, Bk 2, D. XI, a. 2, q. 3, ad 2: 'Et per hunc modum verbum Isaiae, quod subsequitur, potest intelligi vel exponi, ut *Angeli pacis* dicantur ibi *boni praelati*. Si tamen quis intelligit de Angelis beatis secundum veritatem, *amaritudo fletus* non indicat veritatem doloris, sed aliquam conformitatem notat in signo vel effectu exteriori; et potest illud intelligi dictum per anthropopathon.'

[43] See for instance, Ross, *The Grief of God*; and Cohen, *The Modulated Scream*, esp. ch. 7: 'Human and Divine Passion'. Cohen argues for a necessary link between the scholastic examination of Christ's suffering and the rise of Passional piety (p. 208).

tions in two of the synoptic Gospels of Christ's behaviour on the night prior to his Passion raised potent questions about the passibility of his soul. When Jesus went to the Garden of Gethsemane to pray with Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, he is reported to have 'begun to sorrow and grow sad' (Matthew 26. 37: 'coepit contristari et maestus esse') and to have confessed to his companions: 'My soul is sorrowful unto death' (Matthew 26. 38: 'tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem'). In the Gospel of Luke, Jesus is said to have been placed at this time 'in great suffering' (Luke 22. 43: 'factus in agonia')[44] and to have prayed so hard that his sweat ran to the ground as drops of blood: 'et factus est sudor eius sicut guttae sanguinis decurrentis in terram' (Luke 22. 44). This was a powerful evocation of a passion in the scholastic sense of the word, involving both an internal emotional state and an associated somatic alteration.

This constituted the accepted reading of Jesus's suffering throughout the Middle Ages. In his *De civitate Dei*, Augustine wrote that as there was in Jesus 'a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion' and that 'when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul'.[45] Ambrose specifically addressed the issue of Christ's sorrow, writing:

> He took my sadness [...] as a man, he took on my sadness [...] Mine is the sadness which he took up along with my ability to suffer [...] He takes pity on me; he is sad in me; he grieves in me.[46]

By the same token, Peter Lombard declared that Jesus took on 'a human nature that was capable of suffering: a soul capable of suffering, and flesh that was capable of suffering and mortal'. Indeed, the indication that Christ's soul was

[44] For a discussion of the polysemy of 'agonia', see Pool, *God's Wounds*, p. 282.

[45] Augustine, *The City of God*, XIV. 9, trans. by Dods, p. 409.

[46] Ambrose, *De fide*, II. 7, ed. by Faller: 'suscepit tristitiam meam. Confidenter tristitiam nomino, quia crucem praedico [...] quia ut homo suscepit tristitiam meam, ut homo locutus est et ideo ait: Non sicut ego uolo, sed sicut tu uis. Mea est tristitia, quam meo suscepit adfectu [...] Mihi conpatitur, mihi tristis est, mihi dolet. Ergo pro me et in me doluit, qui pro se nihil habuit, quod doleret.' However, Ambrose goes on to suggest that Christ suffers and grieves more for humanity and its trials than for himself. See also Ambrose, *De bono mortis*, VII. 27, ed. Schenkl, p. 727: 'siquidem Iesus ait: tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem, affectum hominis in se exprimens' (And indeed Jesus said: 'My soul is sorrowful unto death', expressing in himself the emotional disposition of humanity).

truly human was that 'he took on the defects of the soul, namely sadness, fear, pain, and suchlike'.[47]

Origen and Jerome had qualified the matter somewhat by suggesting that Jesus had not experienced these emotions as full-blown passions, but rather as the 'first movements' of a passion, or a propassion. These are affects or feelings (stirrings) to which human nature is inherently subject but to which the consent of the will is not ultimately given.[48] Jerome argued this interpretation from the syntax of passage in Matthew which declared that Jesus '*began* to sorrow and be sad' ('coepit [...]'), stating that 'it is one thing to be saddened, another thing to begin to be saddened'.[49] That Jesus suffered only propassions became the orthodox line throughout medieval theology,[50] repeated, for instance, by Peter Lombard: 'For Christ in his human nature had true fear and sadness [...] these defects exist in us according to both propassion and passion; but they are in Christ only according to propassion.'[51] The same thought was maintained by Aquinas: 'sadness was denied to Christ according to the sense of a completed passion, but it was in him in its first inklings, in the sense of a propassion.'[52] Nevertheless, this was, Aquinas stresses, a true passion: 'And for that reason, just as there could be true suffering (*dolor*) in Christ so there could be true sadness (*tristitia*) in him, although in a different way than it is in us.'[53] As Paul Gondreau concludes:

[47] Peter Lombard, *The Sentences*, Book III: *On the Incarnation of the Word*, D. XV, C. 1. 1, trans. by Silano, III, 57; see also D. XV, C. 1. 7, p. 59.

[48] On the concept of propassions see Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 122–95.

[49] Jerome, *Commentariorum in Matheum*, IV, ed. by Hurst and Adriaen: 'quod dominus, ut ueritatem adsumpti probaret hominis, uere quidem contristatus sit sed, ne passio in animo illius dominaretur, per propassionem coeperit contristari. Aliud est enim contristari et aliud incipere contristari.'

[50] Beyond medieval theology, however, it met with a number of powerful detractors, such as Erasmus of Rotterdam who took it to task in his *Disputatiuncula de taedio, pavore, tristicia Iesu*, trans. by Heath, pp. 56–57. See Tracy, 'Humanists among the Scholastics', pp. 38–39, and Madigan, *The Passion of Christ in High-Medieval Thought*, esp. ch. 6: 'Christus passibilis'.

[51] Peter Lombard, *The Sentences*, Book III: *On the Incarnation of the Word*, D. XV, C. 2. 1, trans. by Silano, III, 61.

[52] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, III, Q. 15, a. 6, ad 1: 'tristitia removetur a Christo secundum passionem perfectam, fuit tamen in eo initiata, secundum propassionem.'

[53] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Q. 15, a. 6, co: 'Et ideo, sicut in Christo potuit esse verus dolor, ita in eo potuit esse vera tristitia, alio tamen modo quam in nobis est.'

> St. Thomas' account of Christ's passion provides a highly nuanced and resounding defense of what many would consider an inherent impossibility: the coexistence of movements of passion, even intense ones, and moral perfection. Aquinas presents to his readers the image of a sinless man who remains yet fully alive with intense emotion.[54]

The key point here was that Christ's ability to feel an emotion like sadness was recognized as a fundamental marker of his humanity. Insofar as sadness designated the true humanity of Christ, the attribution of sadness to demons trod dangerous ground, bringing them into closer likeness not just with flawed humanity, but also with the sinless human nature of Christ as well.

Sorrow as Productive of Remorse and Repentance

One of the greatest dangers inherent in the attribution of sadness to demons was, however, the potential development of sadness into remorse and repentance. This pathway had a biblical basis in Paul's declaration that he rejoiced in the sadness of the Corinthians insofar as it brought them to repentance ('nunc gaudeo non quia contristati estis sed quia contristati estis ad paenitentiam'), since sadness according to God worked a lasting repentance ('quae enim secundum Deum tristitia est, paenitentiam in salutem stabilem operatur', II Corinthians 7. 9–10). Similarly, Caesarius of Heisterbach described contrition as a state arising from grief over sins ('dolor de peccatis'), with repentance specifically defined as an internal grief ('dolor [...] interior') that alleviates guilt.[55] More significantly, Caesarius made emotion one of the four key steps leading to justification: there is an infusion of grace which, together with free will, arouses an emotion which leads to contrition and thence to the remission of sins.[56]

Clearly, then, the attribution of the emotion of grief to demonic agents had to be handled carefully to avoid the heretical suggestion that a demon might suffer remorse and then repent, since the early and medieval Church held it as

[54] Gondreau, *The Passions of Christ's Soul*, p. 29.

[55] Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum*, D. II, C. 1, ed. by Strange, I, 56: 'Contritio est cordis poenitudo, scilicet dolor de peccatis. [...] poenitudo dolor est interior, tollens culpam.'

[56] Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum*, D. II, C. 1, ed. by Strange, I, 57: 'In iustificatione peccatoris dicunt quatuor concurrere, gratiae infusionem, motum surgentem ex gratia et libero arbitrio, contritionem, peccatorum remissionem.'

a tenet of orthodoxy that the Devil would necessarily remain obdurate in his evil will and so could never be redeemed. For this reason, Origen's early assertion that the Devil (along with all beings) would eventually be granted redemption (a theology known as 'apokatastasis', a term read as indicative of universal restoration) was condemned at the Second Council of Constantinople in 553.[57] Instead, in a formulation often quoted throughout the Middle Ages, John Damascene theorized that the fall of the angels was to them what death is to humanity — namely the incontrovertible end of any possibility of repentance.[58] Although this statement was associated with and quoted from John Damascene throughout the Middle Ages, it had in fact been drawn by Damascene from the fourth-century father Nemesios.[59] Nemesios' reasoning was that since humans, as corporeal beings, necessarily suffer from disturbances due to the emotions, they are permitted to change their ways throughout their life, and, returning to reason and sound health after violent emotional disruptions, can then seek forgiveness. The angels, however, being incorporeal and therefore unbothered by emotions, as well as by want or desire, must be held to the consequences of their purely rational choice.[60]

In the era of scholasticism, Aquinas argued for the denial of forgiveness to demons on the grounds of choice alone: he suggested that appetition had to fol-

[57] See Ramelli, *The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis*; Satran, 'The Salvation of the Devil'; Forsyth, *The Old Enemy*, ch. 21: 'Origen's Wicked Angel: Universal Fall and Redemption'; and Patrides, 'The Salvation of Satan'. Ramelli makes it clear that Origen's theory of *apokatastasis*, as also Gregory of Nyssa's closely following him, were firmly based in both Old and New Testament texts, plus texts considered by both of them at the time as canonical. She also clarifies that although the concept of *apokatastasis* was in circulation from the end of the second century and into the third in various North African and Near Eastern Christian contexts, it became particularly associated with Origen as he was the first to give it a full and coherent form and make it a part of his theology.

[58] John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, XVIII. 5, ed. by Buytaert, p. 77, lines 38–40: 'Oportet autem scire quoniam quod est hominibus mors, hoc est angelis casus. Post casum enim non est eis paenitentia, quemadmodum neque hominibus post mortem.'

[59] See Louth, *St John Damascene*, p. 124: 'John's presentation of what is essentially Nemesios's teaching was destined to be very influential.'

[60] See Nemesius Emesenus, *De natura hominis, graece et latine*, ed. by von Matthaei, Latin text, pp. 8–9: 'angeli [...] natura omni affectione corporis et inopia et voluptate vacent, merito per poenitentiam ad veniam adspirare non possunt. At homo non modo rationis particeps, sed etiam animal est [...] motusque turbidi persaepe rationem attentant atque labefactant. Quare, cum ad sanitatem redit, et, declinatis turbulentis animi motionibus, virtutem complectitur, justa illi misericordia, id est, venia tribuitur.'

low apprehension, and insofar as angels apprehended things 'immovably' (that is, they apperceived an entirety at once, and did not reason from one idea to another the way humans do), their will clung to the object of their free choice immovably. In other words, they had free will before they chose, but once having chosen, their choice was fixed and immovable. So the good angels who stood firm with God were confirmed in justice, and the evil angels who chose to sin necessarily remain in sin.[61] William of Auvergne also noted that the will of demons remained fixed on the pursuit of evil, so that any theoretical impossibility of them attaining redemption (as, for instance, in Aquinas's reasoning) could not excuse them for their failure to do so since impossibility only excuses what the will would otherwise allow: this is not the case with demons.[62]

Anthropomorphizing demons also rendered them objects of understanding and therefore pity. This is evident with respect to Satan in early modern literature, such as *Paradise Lost*, as the lines extracted at the head of this paper reveal.[63] Gustave Doré's 1866 engravings for *Paradise Lost* which show Satan looking forlorn and lost, Ricardo Bellver's evocative sculpture 'El Ángel Caído' ('The Fallen Angel', Madrid, sculpted in 1877), also inspired by *Paradise Lost*, and Hermann Hesse's poignant short story *'The Field Devil'* (*'Der Feldteufel'*, 1908)[64] similarly reveal that a depiction of sadness and despair in others — even demonic others — can invoke a corresponding sense of compassion and pity in observers, as Aquinas indeed noted in his study of the passion of sadness.[65] As 'sympathy for the devil' was not one of the aims of medieval theology, which needed rather to reify the Devil constantly as the great Adversary, theo-

[61] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, Q. 64, a. 2, co (see also ad 2 and ad 3); see also *De malo*, Q. 16, a. 5.

[62] William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, I, 1045bC: 'Verùm hoc non est eis possibile propter radicationem & profundationem malignitatis in ipsis. Scito tamen, quòd impossibilitas hæc non excusat eos à malitia, vel culpa, & hoc est, quoniam voluntaria est non solùm quoniàm per voluntatem suam se induxerunt in illam, sed etiam cum voluntate mali, & mala, in eis est. Impossibilitas autem excusat, ubi contraria est, voluntati, videlicet ubi voluntas est per impossibilitatem prohibita, vel impedita. Verùm apud eos, sicut impossibile est eis malitiam deserere, sic & voluntarium est eisdem persistere in eadem.' See also Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, Bk 2, D. 7, Pt. 1, a. 1, q. 1.

[63] For an analysis of remorse and repentance in *Paradise Lost* see Benet, 'Adam's Evil Conscience and Satan's Surrogate Fall', esp. pp. 5, 8, 11.

[64] Hermann Hesse, *'The Field Devil'*, ed. by Ziolkowski and trans. by Manheim, pp. 139–45.

[65] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, Q. 35, a. 8, co: 'Unde extraneum obiectum tristitiae accipi potest vel secundum alterum tantum, quia scilicet est malum, sed non proprium, et sic est misericordia, quae est tristitia de alieno malo, inquantum tamen aestimatur ut proprium.'

retical and literary formulations that might result in compassion for the Devil and his demons had to be curtailed.

Conclusion

Sadness was a dangerous emotion to attribute to demons in the Middle Ages. There was a strong desire to view demons as capable of suffering for their rebellion against God, and whose suffering would distinguish them from the good angels who were confirmed in grace and impassibility. Yet creating suffering demons constituted them as potential figures of pity and compassion and left open the heretical possibility that they could travel from sorrow to repentance. It also brought them perilously close to the 'suffering servant' Christ whose sadness was both a marker of humanity and essential to the redemption of the world.

The attribution of sadness to demons was a later arrival in medieval Latinate writings, with more typical demonic emotions being anger, hatred, and lust. At first, demonic sadness was depicted as little more than a reactive emotion consequent upon a frustrated will; yet through the investigations of the Scholastics, a picture emerged of sadness as a fundamental component of the demonic constitution, an internal disposition that necessarily affected everything demons did.

By the end of the thirteenth century, medieval demons had begun to exhibit symptoms of sadness, grief, despair, and remorse. It would take until the early modern period, however, to produce a demon that could appear as a fully emotional being, one so completely open to affect that he could be described as imprisoned 'in his own reified emotions'.[66]

[66] Stavely, 'Satan and Arminianism in *Paradise Lost*', p. 135.

Works Cited

Primary Sources

Ambrose, *De bono mortis*, ed. by Karl Schenkl, in *Sancti Ambrosii opera*, I: *Exameron; De paradiso; De Cain et Abel; De Noe; De Abraham; De Isaac; De bono mortis*, CSEL, 32 pt 1 (Vienna: Tempsky, 1897), pp. 701–53

——, *De fide*, ed. by Otto Faller, *Sancti Ambrosii opera*, VIII, CSEL, 78 (Vienna: Hölder–Pichler–Tempsky, 1962)

Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, trans. by M. J. Charlesworth, in *Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works*, ed. by Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 82–104

——, *Proslogion*, ed. by F. S. Schmitt, *Opera Omnia*, 6 vols (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1946–61), I, 93–104

Augustine, *De patientia*, ed. by Joseph Zycha, in *Sancti Aureli Augustini De fide et symbolo; De fide et operibus; De agone christiano; De continentia; De bono coniugali; De sancta virginitate; De bono viduitatis; De adulterinis coniugiis lib. II; De mendacio; Contra mendacium; De opere monachorum; De divinatione daemonum; De cura pro mortuis gerenda; De patientia*, CSEL, 41, 3 vols in 5 pts (Vienna: Tempsky, 1900)

——, *The City of God*, trans. by Marcus Dods (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2010)

——, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, trans. by Edmund Hill, in *On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees, Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis, The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2002)

Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum* <http://www.franciscan-archive. org/bonaventura/sent.html> [accessed 10 September 2014]

Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum*, ed. by Joseph Strange, 2 vols (Cologne, Bonn, and Brussels: Heberle, 1851)

Erasmus, *Disputatiuncula de taedio, pavore, tristicia Iesu*, trans. by Michael J. Heath, in *Collected Works of Erasmus*, 86 vols to date (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974–), LXX: *Spiritualia and Pastoralia*, ed. by John W. O'Malley (1998)

Hesse, Hermann, *'The Field Devil'*, ed. by Theodore Ziolkowski and trans. by Ralph Manheim, in *Stories of Five Decades* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974)

Jean Gerson, *Œuvres complètes de Jean Gerson*, ed. by Palémon Glorieux, 10 vols in 11 (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1960–73)

Jerome, *Commentariorum in Matheum libri IV*, ed. by David Hurst and Marcus Adriaen, in *S. Hieronymi presbyteri opera*, VII. 1: *Opera exegetica*, CCSL, 77 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969)

John Cassian, *Conferences*, ed. and trans. by E. Pichery, *Conférences, I–VII* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1955)

——, *Conferences*, trans. by Boniface Ramsey (New York: Newman Press, 1997)

——, *Institutes*, ed. by Michael Petschenig, *De institutis coenobiorum et de octo principalium uitiorum remediis*, CSEL, 17 (Vienna: Tempsky, 1888)

——, *Institutes*, trans. by Boniface Ramsey (New York: Newman Press, 2000)
John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. by Eligius M. Buytaert (New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1955)
Milton, John, *Paradise Lost*, ed. by Alistair Fowler, 2nd edn (New York: Longman, 1998)
Nemesius Emesenus, *De natura hominis, graece et latine*, ed. by Christian Friedrich von Matthaei (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967; facsimile repr. Halle, 1802)
Otloh von St. Emmeram, *Liber visionum*, ed. by Paul Gerhard Schmidt, *MGH Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters*, 13 (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus, 1989)
Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. by Bernard Jansen, 3 vols (Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Colegii S. Bonaventurae, 1922–26)
Peter Lombard, *The Sentences*, trans. by Guilio Silano, Mediaeval Sources in Translation, 42–43, 45, 48, 4 vols (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007–10)
Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis*, in *Corpus Thomisticum. S. Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia* <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html> [accessed 10 September 2014]
——, *Summa contra Gentiles*, in *Corpus Thomisticum. S. Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia* <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html> [accessed 10 September 2014]
——, *Summa Theologiae*, in *Corpus Thomisticum. S. Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia* <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html> [accessed 10 September 2014]
William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, 2 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva, 1963; facsimile repr. of Paris, 1674)

Secondary Studies

Cohen, Esther, *The Modulated Scream: Pain in Late Medieval Culture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010)
Dendle, Peter, *Satan Unbound: The Devil in Old English Narrative Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001)
Finnegan, Robert Emmett, *Christ and Satan: A Critical Edition* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1977)
Forsyth, Neil, *The Old Enemy: Satan and the Combat Myth* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989)
——, *The Satanic Epic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003)
Gondreau, Paul, *The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2009)
Hind, Arthur M., *An Introduction to a History of Woodcut with a Detailed Survey of Work Done in the Fifteenth Century*, 2 vols (New York: Dover, 1963; orig. publ. 1935)
Keck, David, *Angels & Angelology in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)
King, Peter, 'Aquinas on the Passions', in *Aquinas's Moral Theory*, ed. by Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 101–32
Knuuttila, Simo, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)

Krapp, George P., *The Junius Manuscript* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931)
Kretzmann, Norman, 'Aquinas on God's Joy, Love, and Liberality', *Modern Schoolman*, 72 (1995), 125–48
Lieb, Michael, 'Reading God: Milton and the Anthropopathetic Tradition', *Milton Studies*, 25 (1989), 213–43
Louth, Andrew, *St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
Madigan, Kevin, *The Passion of Christ in High-Medieval Thought: An Essay on Christological Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)
Miner, Robert, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of 'Summa theologiae' 1a2ae 22–48* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
Patrides, C. A., 'The Salvation of Satan', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 28 (1967), 467–78
Pool, Jeff B., *God's Wounds: Hermeneutic of the Christian Symbol of Divine Suffering*, II: *Evil and Divine Suffering* (Eugene: Pickwick, 2010)
Ramelli, Ilaria L. E., *The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 120 (Leiden: Brill, 2013)
Rosenwein, Barabara H., *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006)
Ross, Ellen M., *The Grief of God: Images of the Suffering Jesus in Late Medieval England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)
Ruys, Juanita Feros, 'Sensitive Spirits: Changing Depictions of Demonic Emotions in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries', *Digital Philology*, 1 (2012), 184–209
Satran, David, 'The Salvation of the Devil: Origen and Origenism in Jerome's Biblical Commentaries', *Studia Patristica*, 23 (1989), 171–77
Stavely, Keith W. F., 'Satan and Arminianism in *Paradise Lost*', *Milton Studies*, 25 (1989), 125–39
Tracy, James D., 'Humanists among the Scholastics: Erasmus, More, and Lefèvre d'Étaples on the Humanity of Christ', *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook*, 5 (1985), 30–51
Treviño Benet, Diana, 'Adam's Evil Conscience and Satan's Surrogate Fall', *Milton Quarterly*, 39 (2005), 2–15
Weinandy, Thomas G., *Does God Suffer?* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000)
Wenzel, Siegfried, *The Sin of Sloth: Acedia in Medieval Thought and Literature* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967)